New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes::Diverging local social policies and state-voluntary sector relations in an era of localism by Rees, James & Rose, Nigel
 
 
University of Birmingham
New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes:
Rees, James; Rose, Nigel
DOI:
10.1332/204080515X14251102462656
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Rees, J & Rose, N 2015, 'New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: Diverging local social policies and
state-voluntary sector relations in an era of localism', Voluntary Sector Review, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 81-91.
https://doi.org/10.1332/204080515X14251102462656
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Voluntary Sector Review
 
New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: diverging local social policies and
state-voluntary sector relations in an era of Localism
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number: VSR-D-15-00006R2
Full Title: New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: diverging local social policies and
state-voluntary sector relations in an era of Localism
Article Type: Policy review
Keywords: Localism;  devolution;  governance;  voluntary organisations.
Corresponding Author: James Rees
University of Birmingham
Birmingham, UNITED KINGDOM
First Author: James Rees
Order of Authors: James Rees
Nigel Rose
Abstract: This paper aims to examine what the policy, practice and academic implications are of
England becoming a container of diverse social policies as a result of the
implementation of policies of Localism. Through a case study of Greater Manchester
(GM) it addresses the implications for the local voluntary sector. GM is a key example
of an ambitious local public sector assemblage that is attempting complex, large-scale
policy implementation in the context of greater devolution .
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
  
New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: diverging local social policies 
and state-voluntary sector relations in an era of Localism 
 
Like its New Labour predecessor, the UK Coalition government has promoted 
renewed localism in policy-making, democratic deliberation and the delivery of 
public services (Deas et al., 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). It introduced 
the Localism Act in 2012, and has also promoted an economic development 
agenda partly based on the idea of ‘rebalancing’ the UK’s London-centric 
economy through new local authority-private sector ‘Local Enterprise 
Partnerships’ (LEPs), city deals, and support for combined authorities (CAs) at 
city-region level (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013). The devolution debate has been 
given renewed impetus by the fall-out from the tight (55-45%) Scottish 
Independence referendum in September 2014 which at the time of writing 
seems set to have far-reaching consequences for potential devolution of 
powers to combined authorities in England. Indeed, in November 2014 the 
Government announced that it plans to adopt a radical devolution programme 
to combined authorities starting with the election of a Mayor of Greater 
Manchester. This programme will grant powers that go beyond those granted to 
the Mayor of London and may include control over an integrated health and 
social care budget dependent on Greater Manchester making a convincing 
business case.  
 
This paper aims to demonstrate, through a brief overview of the Coalition 
government’s Localism policy agenda, and consideration of the Greater 
Manchester (GM) city region as a case study area, that localism has important 
implications for voluntary sector organisations (VSOs). In particular, we suggest 
that VSOs play a difficult and conflicted role in mediating the tensions and 
Revised Manuscript (track changes accepted)
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contradictions created by ‘Localist’ policies, and may be struggling to meet the 
expectations placed on them in the context of the Big Society and Localism 
agendas as well as the apparent retrenchment and withdrawal of the state from 
welfare provision. In particular, the case study discussion focuses on the 
implications for VSOs of Greater Manchester’s Public Sector Reform (PSR) 
programme, assuming, that, as is intended, devolution allows for the extension 
and development of this programme. 
 
 
A new ‘New Localism’? 
 
Following its formation in May 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government, against the backdrop of the 2007/08 financial crisis, 
immediately set out an ‘austerity’ policy agenda based on deficit reduction 
through major spending cuts which would hit local government particularly hard. 
Two policy ideas developed during opposition – those of Localism and the ‘Big 
Society’ – were rapidly rolled out, both aiming in slightly different ways to 
devolve control of social policy, socio-economic development and civic renewal 
away from the state to a more local level. These were based on principles of 
localising power and funding, reducing ‘burdens’ and regulation, and 
encouraging diversity of provision and local innovation (Alcock, 2010; Stoker 
and Taylor-Gooby, 2011). The Localism Bill, introduced in 2010, represented a 
potentially radical moment for localism: “stripping away much of the regulatory 
infrastructure governing local authorities and creating a general power of 
competence for local government, strengthening community accountability 
through referendums and other devices, and empowering communities to take 
over state-run services” (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 26).  
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As a number of commentators have suggested, the combination of spending 
cuts, a new and potentially radical localism and the clear rhetorical relaxation of 
central government attitudes to (potentially emergent) pluralism and spatial 
differentiation has the potential to allow (or even force) greater innovation and 
therefore greater differentiation in social policy characteristics and content 
between different places (see for example Deas et al., 2012). As Lowndes and 
Pratchett put it, the 
Coalition’s ‘sink or swim’ approach to localism diverges significantly from 
that of New Labour… [which was] always hedged by the desire to retain 
control over significant public investments, and to maintain principles of 
standardisation and equity over and above those of diversity and local 
control. (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 37, emphasis added).  
 
However, subsequent critics have pointed out that despite the opportunities and 
potential inherent within this generally permissive overall policy environment 
there are some critical barriers to its realisation. For Padley (2013), in order for 
decentralisation and community empowerment to be successfully delivered, 
they need to be “undergirded by significant levels of social trust [based on] 
collaboration and co-production” (p. 351). For others, noting particularly the 
context of resource scarcity, there are clear risks in extending (central) 
government control into previously autonomous domains in civil society 
(Milbourne and Cushman, 2014), and diminishing local government’s role as an 
arbiter of competing local interests (Ishkanian and Szreter, 2012). 
 
However, in this paper we draw attention to two aspects of the debate we feel 
have hindered a fuller interpretation of the consequences of the policy of 
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Localism. Firstly, we note that – despite the admittedly variable and halting real 
progress towards localism in practice – much debate is still presaged on the 
normative assumption that the national (that is, English) scale is the primary 
scale for policy-making. If a new era of ‘radical localism’ comes to pass it will be 
important to take seriously the development of locally tailored and designed 
social policy, albeit within the context of a still relatively centralised state and 
where there is complex multi-level governance. In taking policy-creation and 
implementation at the GM level seriously in this paper, we begin to redress the 
balance. Secondly, we argue that the role, demands of, and requirements 
placed on the voluntary sector have tended to be downplayed or even ignored 
by researchers interested in issues of spatial governance on the one hand or 
social policy on the other. This is despite the fact that the voluntary sector plays 
a significant role in both developing, negotiating and dealing with the 
consequences of social policies developed at a variety of scales. We therefore 
aim to address this neglect by considering the impact of localism on the 
voluntary sector, while paying heed to the wider context in which the 
sustainability of the sector – given multiple resource constraints – is in doubt. 
 
Thus overall our broad concern is to address what the conceptual, policy, and 
practice implications are if England is to become a container of diverse social 
policies applying to a range of spatial scales (e.g. city region, local authority, 
neighbourhood). We explore this by focussing on GM and in particular the 
implications for the local voluntary sector. We aim to show that GM is an 
exemplary case study: it demonstrates how an ambitious local public sector 
assemblage is attempting complex, large-scale policy implementation in the 
context of greater devolution to the city-regional scale. The case study draws 
particularly on the experience of one of the authors in his employment in a 
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Manchester voluntary sector infrastructure body, an organisation which is 
closely involved in mediating the implementation of PSR. Thus it is essentially 
rooted in ‘participant observation’ of the process: attending numerous 
presentations and meetings concerning various elements of the PSR 
programme, taking part in cost benefit analysis training, and organising a 
number of workshops for VSOs about PSR. The case study is underpinned by 
in-depth personal experience and dialogue with other local actors. Both authors 
have also attended ‘high level’ GM meetings and read a wide range of 
associated documents, some of which are referenced in the article. 
 
Public Service Reform in Greater Manchester  
 
The development of local social policy in GM 
 
Greater Manchester (GM) contains 2.68 million people and comprises the ten 
boroughs of Manchester, Rochdale, Oldham, Wigan, Salford, Stockport, 
Trafford, Tameside, Bury, and Bolton. Collectively they have maintained a 
semblance of metropolitan governance through the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and more recently achieved, in 2011, the status 
of Combined Authority, joined by four others in 2014. The context of austerity 
has increased pressures on the 10 local authorities to seek economies of scale 
by centralising functions and collaborating in commissioning public services. To 
some extent, and with much diminished resources, AGMA and its associated 
agencies have taken over the strategic role formerly done on a regional basis 
by North West Development Agency (abolished in 2011) and now negotiate 
directly with central government. 
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Because GM has already received extensive coverage for its insistently 
entrepreneurial governance reforms (see Harding et al., 2010; Rees and Lord, 
2013), we focus here on the potentially radical and transformational approach to 
the delivery and management of welfare services. Crucially, GM has taken a 
single-minded and distinctive approach to what it sees as the mounting crisis in 
welfare services: massive increase in need at the same time as decreasing 
resources. The approach is spearheaded by New Economy, a sort of think-tank 
cum quasi-executive agency for Greater Manchester, alongside senior officers 
for the 10 LAs that make up AGMA together with other public sector agencies 
such as GM Police, the Crime Commissioner and the newly reformed local 
NHS. 
 
Greater Manchester is also one of the 4 areas of the UK selected to trial Whole 
Place Community Budgets alongside Essex, West Chester and ‘London Tri-
Borough’. Community Budgets is described as a partnership between these 
areas and national government in co-producing more efficient welfare services 
through pooling budgets between public authorities and using tools such as 
‘customer journey mapping’ and ‘cost-benefit analysis’. They are an explicit 
attempt to produce local solutions, but within an ideological framework set by 
national government. 
 
At its heart, GM’s proposed solution to dealing with diminishing resources is to 
increase the efficiency of welfare services, and to stem future demand. Part of 
its diagnosis is that there is a systemic problem in the way that services 
approach social problems (MIER, 2009). The benefits from an innovation in one 
part of the system should accrue to other parts of the system, but there is no 
effective feedback loop of innovation and each of the public authorities continue 
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to plan and operate in isolation. Thus the remedy is to implement a joined-up 
approach to the needs analysis, planning and commissioning of new services 
for the area.  
 
So far there is little that departs from the script generated by a decade or so of 
academic, think tank and Government-sponsored research around public 
service system reform. Governmental initiatives have identified the need for a 
joined up approach not least the Total Place Initiative begun by New Labour, 
which aimed to identify and quantify the public funding streams going into an 
area and how they might be combined and used in ways that generated savings 
in the longer term. Other examples include Civil Service generated concepts 
such as ‘save to gain’, the early action/intervention philosophy underpinning the 
Allen Report and the subsequent Early Intervention Foundation (Allen, 2011), as 
well as the theory of change that underpins social impact bonds (SIBs).  
 
However, there are some important nuances and developments in the way that 
GM is pursuing public services and welfare reform. The approach is based on 
an economic model of efficiency with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) at its heart. 
The model was developed by New Economy’s economists and agreed with 
twelve government departments. Initially, four ‘problem areas’ were identified as 
the focus for Public Services Reform (PSR):  
 
1) Troubled Families: Reducing the cost to the public purse of a number of 
families that are high users of public services. 
2) Health and Social Care: Integrated working that increases resilience and 
promotes independence. 
3) Transforming Justice: Reducing levels of crime by focusing on services 
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for priority and prolific offenders. 
4) Early Years: Increasing the number of children who arrive at school 
ready to learn. 
 
For each problem area a new delivery model (NDM) has been created based 
around a number of targeted and evidence-based interventions, which it is 
hoped will bring about ‘transformational change’ within a small number of years. 
The predicted savings arising from the interventions will be used to develop a 
business plan (investible proposition) to raise investment from central 
government to fund the transitional costs. As well as paying back the investment 
the business plan will enable welfare services (at least those within the aegis of 
the ‘family’ of Greater Manchester public bodies) to deliver better services with 
less money. 
 
PSR involves using money differently, investing in tried and tested ways 
of working, which deliver a return on investment, which in turn can then 
be re-used. (MCC, 2013, p 2) 
 
The most advanced of the PSR streams is Troubled Families due to central 
government investment (HM Government, 2014). The focus of the programme 
is a “defined cohort” of the “most troubled” individuals or families who are high 
cost to local public bodies. Each individual family who is referred to the 
programme is allocated a key worker who makes an assessment and offers a 
range of Tier 1 “interventions” (assertive outreach, parenting team, family 
intervention project, families first) which are carefully “sequenced” (delivered at 
the right time in the right order) and supported by a number of Tier 2 
interventions (In Manchester many of these are spot purchased from VSOs to 
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make sure they are available at the point they are needed) – see Figure 1 for 
illustration of the model. 
 
Fundamental to the approach is the seamless referral to services, 
through improved sequencing and prioritisation of cases. (MCC, 2013, p 
4) 
 
Figure 1 here. 
 
The programme is evaluated by the use of randomised control trials (RCTs), in 
which one area of GM operating ‘business as usual’ (BAU) services is 
compared to the NDM being operated in another location within GM. The 
Greater Manchester Troubled Families Impact and Evidence Toolkit (AGMA, 
2014) is employed, again based on a CBA model, to demonstrate the financial 
“evidence of [financial] savings” accrued by the programme.  
 
This article does not aim to assess the Troubled Families Programme in GM, 
but to focus on the participation – or rather, barriers to – of VSOs as 
stakeholders in reform and the implications of such potentially radical changes 
to the nature of welfare provision. 
 
The implications of PSR for the voluntary sector 
 
In our opinion, there are several problematic areas in the Troubled Families 
approach that militate against the involvement of VSOs and this article 
concentrates on three: the appearance of ‘central planning’ at a GM Level; the 
privileging of certain forms of evidence over others in the design and evaluation 
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of policy success; and shortcomings in the theory of change underpinning the 
model. None of these are new problems in VSO involvement – either at the 
local level or more nationally – but they have been brought together in a specific 
way within the Troubled Families Programme such that we believe it may have 
significant implications for the future involvement of VSOs in GM’s approach to 
PSR. 
 
i) ‘Central Planning’ at a GM Level 
 
The Troubled Families approach was developed at Greater Manchester level by 
the public sector, primarily local authorities, led by the PSR team based within 
New Economy. This small team, within a very short period, and with little public 
or VSO scrutiny and involvement designed a radically new approach to key 
problems using a technocratic, centralised planning model. As a result the 
language used in the planning is jargonised and difficult to understand for 
many, if not most VSOs. 
 
Many smaller VSOs are relatively isolated and lack networks of influence that 
extend beyond their local borough – those that do tend to be national 
organisations with local branches. Equally, there are only a small number of 
VSOs that operate specifically at the Greater Manchester scale, and whose 
footprint therefore matches that of the GM institutions. Local VSOs and 
infrastructure bodies, principally Councils for Voluntary Service (CVSs) have 
been slow to understand and react to the shift of power and decision-making to 
the GM level, and their capacity to react and influence has been exacerbated by 
spending cutbacks and reduced capacity. In the case of PSR the scale of the 
crisis facing public bodies was used by the PSR team to explain why there had 
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been so little involvement or consultation. However this is in a context where 
democratic involvement at GM level from civil society organisations has been 
relatively under-developed.  
 
ii) Privileged forms of evidence 
 
The Tier 1 interventions within the Troubled Families Programme are chosen on 
the basis of an evidence hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is randomised 
control trials carried out in the UK less than a year ago. This type of evidence is 
estimated to have a data error of 2 per cent, which feeds into the predicted 
fiscal impact (money saved to the state) using cost benefit analysis. At the 
bottom of the hierarchy is uncorroborated expert judgement more than 5 years 
old which is essentially useless as it has an estimated data error of 40 per cent. 
New Economy run a cost benefit analysis network and regular training sessions 
to enable both VSOs and statutory bodies to estimate the fiscal impact of their 
services. 
 
Leaving aside the contentious idea of an evidence hierarchy there is, and likely 
will continue to be, a central problem for VSOs in the theoretical construct of an 
‘intervention’, a tightly defined set of practices codified in a manual, backed up 
by a set of professional standards, which is transferable and reproducible. Many 
VSOs do not describe the work they do as interventions and find it difficult to 
parcel up their services in this way. They tend to constantly tailor the work they 
do to fit the particular context of the individual they are helping (for example 
adopting an ethos of person-centredness), as well as attempting to modify the 
external service environment for the benefit of the client (for example adopting a 
model of creating seamless or wrap-around services). There are parallels, too, 
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with the observations of inflexible or excessive audit and performance targets 
re-shaping organisations’ activities (Power, 1999). 
 
Secondly, even where the services that a VSO provides can be parcelled up 
into interventions, few if any VSOs have the resources, time or expertise to 
carry out RCTs. Where monitoring and evaluation is carried out it tends to be 
relatively unsophisticated and rely on user feedback, case studies and small 
numbers of clients. The standard being used is simply too difficult for VSOs to 
meet so all but the largest are unable to participate. The evidence that they can 
provide which shows high levels of impact and success, is invariably dismissed 
as it does not rate highly in the evidence hierarchy. New ‘evidence-based’ 
interventions are preferred to existing working models. ‘What works’ is restricted 
to specified interventions which are accompanied by ‘high quality’ research 
evidence. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, the use of RCTs in 
social contexts – where environmental influences are difficult to control – has 
also drawn criticism, and attention has been drawn to problems involved in rigid 
adherence to evidence hierarchies (Nutley et al., 2012). 
 
iii) Theory of Change  
 
The theory of change underpinning the PSR model, as defined in the NDM for 
the Troubled Families Programme, in common with other pathway models, 
resembles an industrial process. This is not to suggest that key workers 
involved in the programme treat their clients as if they were objects, rather, it is 
a metaphor of the theoretical model. A ‘troubled family’ enters at one end as a 
set of needs; each of the needs is defined and separated; and an appropriate 
intervention is found to solve each need. The process is made more efficient 
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through prioritisation, sequencing and isolating the pre-defined symptoms of 
those most in need. The ‘troubled family’ is de-contextualised, in particular from 
communities of geography and identity. The model could apply anywhere, in 
any community and is not a locally-based solution. 
 
It is difficult to see how local VSOs who work within a particular geographical 
community or with a particular community of interest fit within the model, instead 
they are viewed in an instrumental manner as external points of referral. Their 
holistic models of work, based often on a deep and rich understanding of the 
environment and identity of a troubled family or individual, and on a recognition 
of the structural and systemic inequalities that they face, is at odds with the 
decontextualized, problem-based, ‘industrial process’ model of the Troubled 
Families Programme. Some of the solutions may achieve similar ends, for 
example, if a person has debt problems then these need to be resolved. 
However, local VSOs often place emphasis on linking the person back into their 
communities, an approach that depends on highly localised knowledge and 
networks, ultimately resulting in more sustainable solutions. The models of 
change are conceptually and practically different. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
A central point of this paper is that there is no one version of localism. Indeed, 
this arguably hints at the Coalition’s underpinning motivation for pursuing 
localist policies: weakening mechanisms for national redistribution and spatial 
justice (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). But the Coalition vision of localism is 
overlaid on already-existing forms that have strong forward momentum. We 
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argue that GM is the foremost example of this and we characterise its approach 
as city-regional localism in which civic entrepreneurs have been able to develop 
their own forms of local solutions in the generally permissive Coalition policy 
environment. The most recent announcement of the intention to create a Mayor 
of Greater Manchester and to devolve a raft of powers to the city-region further 
reinforces the trend toward city-regional localism and demonstrates, we believe, 
the potential for further divergence in real social policies between metropolitan 
areas. If it comes to pass it will, in effect, be the proof of the localist pudding. 
Senior leaders and officers within GM hope it will be the platform for extending 
and developing the GM Public Services Reform Model, particularly as the 
decentralisation of health and welfare spending will depend on a business case 
underpinned by the various technocratic models described above. 
 
However, as the example of the Troubled Families programme – crucially, a 
nationally-developed and funded package which has been tweaked and 
redesigned through the highly specific policy-making apparatus at the GM level 
– shows, there are real dilemmas and barriers facing the voluntary and 
community sector, with significant consequences for the nature and quality of 
services that can be delivered. This matters because the voluntary sector is 
both being recruited as part of the reform efforts, and at the same time its 
functions and existing contributions to social welfare are being taken for granted 
by city-regional policy-makers, chief among them New Economy, AGMA and 
their close partners. At the same time, the expertise for which the sector is 
being sought is being undermined by the nature of the reforms. Troubled 
Families is a flagship programme intended to demonstrate the potential for 
increased efficiency of statutory services, likely to be at the core of GM’s 
argument to devolve further powers over health and welfare spending.  
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We have demonstrated that VSOs in Manchester had little involvement in the 
design and planning phase, in general do not understand the model, feel 
alienated by the technocratic language and criteria, and only have a peripheral 
role in delivery. Rather than supporting the work of local VSOs, building on what 
they do, and valuing the service evidence that they produce, the Troubled 
Families Programme is a centrally planned, problem-based, key-worker model. 
Like the rest of the PSR, it is underpinned by mechanistic logics of cost-benefit 
analysis and narrow, measurement-based forms of research-quality evidence. 
Within the discourse created by this technocratic policy approach, VSOs and 
the community are considered to be part of an external environment, as 
subjects to be manipulated rather than as potential partners to be worked with – 
as envisaged in the concept of co-production (Padley, 2013). These tensions, 
added to more general pressures such as the workforce implications of the 
more widespread adoption of spot contracting, raise pressing questions about 
the ability of VSOs in the area to contribute to the longer-term maintenance of 
effective services that create meaningful outcomes for clients and citizens more 
broadly.  
 
Infrastructure bodies, principally local councils for voluntary service (CVSs) 
traditionally act as the mediators between the state and VSOs, but even staff 
within CVSs have found the models and language associated with PSR difficult 
to understand and have struggled to involve VSOs in an approach where the 
pattern of services was pre-determined and invariably excluded existing working 
services. There are limited exceptions for organisations able to provide 
evidence of their effectiveness in the forms required but this applies to few local 
providers. Large VSOs may have the capacity to benefit from the PSR 
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programme: their scale of operation allows them to collect and wield evidence 
and bid for large contracts, and some may be willing to align with the PSR 
approach. To some extent a city-regional localism may help them by simplifying 
their relationship with a streamlined governance body (compared to having to 
maintain relationships with officers and politicians in all ten boroughs). In 
contrast, it is difficult to see how small and medium-sized VSOs working in 
health and social services – traditionally a crucial part of the local service 
landscape – can engage successfully. Many of these organisations focus on the 
needs of communities at a hyper-local level, and are unwilling or unable to 
bridge to higher scales, in this case to the city-region. They are portrayed as 
old-fashioned and insufficiently innovative, while at the same time the 
assumption is that they will be able to respond as required to fill gaps left by 
retreating public services.  
 
Devolution of powers and finance to GM has been lauded as the solution to the 
fiscal and social problems besetting the city-region, and its example has 
allowed the Coalition to position itself as serious about localism and devolution. 
GM is often portrayed, particularly in Westminster and Whitehall, as a path-
breaker that other urban areas should follow. In GM, the clear signs are that 
what has been developing is an elite, entrepreneurial, technocratic, and 
insufficiently democratic version of city regional localism. This is hardly the Big 
Society-esque vision of creative, locally-developed, autonomous solutions 
situated in inclusive, harmonious arrangements of civil society, a slimmed down 
state and private sector contributions, envisioned in the policy formulation of 
Localism. The authors’ previous research suggests that other major English 
cities do indeed imitate and adapt developments in GM, albeit refracted through 
their own specific local political configurations, political-cultural traditions and 
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local government-civil society relationships. We suggest therefore that policy-
makers, practitioners and scholars in spatial governance, social policy, and 
voluntary sector studies, need to be alert to the implications of different forms of 
localism, and carry out grounded research into its manifestations in different 
places. 
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Figure 1: Taken from the Greater Manchester Troubled Families Model, Source: 
http://www.manchester.gov.uk/manchesterpartnership/downloads/file/228/troubled_f
amilies_programme_presentation, accessed 9.11.14 
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